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Abstract
There is a growing need for usable and secure authentica-
tion in virtual reality (VR). Established concepts (e.g., 2D
graphical PINs) are vulnerable to observation attacks, and
proposed alternatives are relatively slow. We present Ru-
bikAuth, a novel authentication scheme for VR where users
authenticate quickly by selecting digits from a virtual 3D
cube that is manipulated with a handheld controller. We re-
port two studies comparing how pointing using gaze, head
pose, and controller tapping impacts RubikAuth’s usabil-
ity and observation resistance under three realistic threat
models. Entering a four-symbol RubikAuth password is fast:
1.69 s to 3.5 s using controller tapping, 2.35 s to 4.68 s us-
ing head pose, and 2.39 s to 4.92 s using gaze and highly
resilient to observations; 97.78% to 100% of observation at-
tacks were unsuccessful. Our results suggest that providing
attackers with support material contributes to more realistic
security evaluations.
Author Keywords
Usable Security; Authentication; Virtual Reality
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing→ Human computer inter-
action (HCI); •Security and privacy→ Authentication;
Introduction and Related Work
The surge of new immersive virtual reality applications
[2, 7, 23], and the availability of high-end untethered head-
mounted displays (HMDs) [6, 27], has made VR ubiquitous.
However, the ability to experience VR almost anywhere
comes with security implications. Users are often required
to authenticate in VR to, for example, make in-app pur-
chases [17] or to verify their identity [16]. Recent research
indicates established authentication methods such as PINs
or 2D graphical PINs [11, 30] are prone to observation at-
tacks when used in VR. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact VR users are often unaware of bystanders [9,24].
System Authentication
Time
RubikAuth
eye gaze 2.39 s-4.92 s
head pose 2.35 s-4.68 s
tapping 1.69 s-3.5 s
RoomLock [10] 8.58 s-14.33 s
HoloPass [14] 16.69 s
LookUnlock [8] ≈6 s*
2D PINs [11] 2.38 s-3.84 s
2D/3D PINs [30] ≈10.5 s-19 s
VRPursuits [21] 21.40 s
System Observation
Resistance
RubikAuth
eye gaze 100%
head pose 97.78%
tapping 97.78%
RoomLock [10] 87.5%-100%
HoloPass [14] not reported
LookUnlock [8] 94.1%-100%
2D PINs [11] not reported
2D/3D PINs [30] not reported
VRPursuits [21] not reported
Table 1: RubikAuth improves
entry times and observation
resistance over many existing
schemes for VR and AR. All
systems above use four-symbol
PINs. (*) Based on the
implementation of LookUnlock [8],
we estimate that entering a
four-symbol PIN takes at least 6 s
(4×1.5 s).
We present RubikAuth, a highly usable and secure 3D au-
thentication scheme for VR. Through two user studies, we
present an in-depth evaluation of the first concept and im-
plementation of authentication in VR using a 3D manipula-
ble object and the impact of three techniques for pointing
at target digits during authentication on the usability (N=23)
and observation resistance (N=15).
RubikAuth’s novelty lies in its use of an easily manipulable
environment-independent 3D object for authentication. We
show that such an object makes authentications a) fast:
users authenticate in 1.69 s to 4.92 s depending on the
pointing method and complexity of the PIN, which is faster
than previous work [8, 10, 14, 21, 30] and b) more secure
against observations by trained attackers: 532 out of 540
(98.52%) attacks failed despite optimal conditions, and us-
ing gaze input creates even higher observation resistance
(100%). Table 1 outlines the comparison to prior works.
RubikAuth: Concept and Implementation
RubikAuth is a knowledge-based authentication scheme,
where users verify their identity by inputting digits on a vir-
tual 3×3×3 cube (Fig. 1). The digits 1-9 are displayed on
five of its six uniquely-coloured surfaces; we omitted the
rear face as it is not easily reachable. The cube pose is di-
rectly linked to the sensed pose of an HTC VIVE controller
held in the non-dominant hand. RubikAuth’s efficiency de-
rives from the use of Guiard’s kinematic chain model for
human asymmetrical bimanual cooperation [12, 13], its
resistance to observation by splitting input on multiple co-
ordinated input modalities [4, 29], and it is faster to select
symbols from polygon 3D shapes than from 2D grids [18].
The advantage of using a manipulable 3D object for authen-
tication in VR is threefold: 1) it gives quick access to many
targets in high speed using minimal wrist movements, 2)
it complicates attacks by requiring attackers need to ob-
serve both the cube manipulations, and the positions of the
selected targets, and 3) the intuitiveness of cube manipu-
lations makes it easier for users to anticipate actions that
improve observation resistance.
To authenticate, the user points at the target digit on the de-
sired surface (Fig. 2), and then presses the trigger button
on the dominant-hand HTC VIVE controller. All RubikAuth
pointing methods use explicit selection by pressing the trig-
ger button. Compared to dwell time, the use of a separate
trigger has several advantages: a) it gives users more con-
trol [15], b) adds an additional channel that attackers must
observe [19, 20], and c) significantly decreases best-case
authentication time; reliable dwell selection requires at least
350 ms per selection [26, 28], implying a minimum of 1.4
seconds to enter a four-symbol PIN.
Threat Models
RubikAuth addresses three realistic threat models that en-
sure optimal conditions for the attacker (Fig. 3). These de-
pict the scenarios where users are in a public space and
are not aware of potential attackers. In all threat models,
the attacker: a) has an optimal view of the user’s interac-
tions, b) can move freely, c) knows the beginning and the
end of the authentication process, d) knows which pointing
method will be used, and e) knows that the user will enter
a four-symbol PIN. The attacker’s knowledge of this infor-
mation is realistic as previous work showed that bystanders
are able to identify the user’s task in VR [9].Figure 1: Users are in full control
of RubikAuth as the cube pose is
linked to their non-dominant hand.
The digits and their order were
visualised using white digits on a
black background.
Figure 2: We experimented with
eye gaze: looking at the target,
depicted with a blue gaze trail;
head pose: moving the target to
the centre of the field of view,
depicted with a pink dot; and
controller tapping: moving the
rendered right hand controller so
that its tip intersects the target. We
did not randomise digit order as
randomising authentication
interface elements reduces
usability significantly [1,3].
Threat Model 1: Pen and Paper
The attacker observes the user during authentication. They
note down observations on a paper on which an abstract
2D form of RubikAuth is drawn with labels showing the sur-
face colours (Fig. 3-1).
Threat Model 2: 3D Replica
In recent work, attackers came up with ways to help them
note down observations (e.g., folding paper to form a 3D
version of a virtual environment [10]). Motivated by these
strategies, in addition to the material used in threat model
1, the attacker uses a real-world replica of the 3D cube: a
Rubik’s cube with overlaid digits (Fig. 3-2).
Threat Model 3: Video Recordings
Motivated by the ubiquity of smartphones, here the attacker
uses a smartphone (S7 EDGE, 12 MP Camera) to record
and freely play back authentications, in addition to all ma-
terial used in threat models 1 and 2 (Fig. 3-3). The attacker
has the advantage of choosing the recording angle as the
user is not aware of their presence due to the HMD [9,24].
User Studies
We conducted two user studies (2×1h) to study RubikAuth’s
usability and observation resistance. Both studies were de-
signed as repeated measures lab experiments. Conditions
were counter balanced using a Latin Square. All partici-
pants were compensated with an £8 online shop voucher.
Both studies complied with university’s ethics procedure.
Figure 3: In the first threat model (1), attackers observe the
experimenter during authentication and use a pen and paper to
note down observations. In the second threat model (2), the
attacker has a real-world 3D replica of RubikAuth to assist in
visualising the user’s input. In the third threat model (3), attackers
use a smartphone to record the experimenter during
authentication and can freely play back the recordings.
Study 1: Usability Evaluation
We recruited 23 participants (13 females, 10 males) aged
between 18 and 54 years (M=27.65,SD=8.26). 11 (47.83%)
had never used VR before. There were two independent
variables: IV1) Pointing Method: we compared pointing
via gaze, head pose and controller tapping (three condi-
tions, Fig. 2), and IV2) Required Switches: we studied the
impact of the number of times the user switches from one
surface to another while authenticating.
A four-symbol PIN in RubikAuth has either 0-switches, 1-
switch, 2-switches, or 3-switches (four conditions). Entering
a 0-switches PIN is equivalent to a classical PIN-pad, so we
treat 0-switches as a baseline.
Procedure
After filling a consent form and a demographics question-
naire, participants were introduced to VR and RubikAuth.
They went through a training session by entering 3 PINs
each with eye gaze, head pose and controller tapping.
We excluded training runs from analysis. Participants then
went through one block per pointing method, entering pre-
defined PINs. In each block, participants entered 2 PINs×4
switches×4 repetitions = 32 PINs/block. Before each PIN
entry, we showed participants which targets they should
select directly on the cube. The order of the digits was high-
lighted with white numbers on a black background (Fig. 1).
Eye Gaze
Switches 0 1 2 3
∑
Threat 1 0 0 0 0 0
Threat 2 0 0 0 0 0
Threat 3 0 0 0 0 0∑
0 0 0 0 0
Head pose
Switches 0 1 2 3
∑
Threat 1 1 0 0 0 1
Threat 2 1 0 0 0 1
Threat 3 1 0 1 0 2∑
3 0 1 0 4
Tapping
Switches 0 1 2 3
∑
Threat 1 2 0 0 0 2
Threat 2 1 0 0 0 1
Threat 3 1 0 0 0 1∑
4 0 0 0 4
Table 2: Attacks against RubikAuth
are rarely successful. Attacks were
only successful against head pose
and controller tapping.
Usability Evaluation Results
We logged 8 PINs×3 pointing methods×4 repetitions×23
participants = 2208 authentications. We excluded 87 out-
liers due to tracking issues, such as moving out of the track-
ing range, or accidentally pressing the menu button on the
HTC VIVE controller.
VR savvy vs. non-VR savvy participants
We compared the performance of participants who used
VR before with those who did not. VR savvy users au-
thenticated in (M=3.27 s,SD=0.623 s) and made 9.56%
errors. For non-VR savvy participants, the values were
(M=3.15 s,SD=0.567 s) and 10.25% respectively. None
of the differences were significant (p > .05). This highlights
the naturalness of interacting with RubikAuth gained from
the use of Guiard’s kinematic chain model [12,13].
Authentication Time
We measured authentication time from the moment the
first entry is made until the fourth symbol is selected. When
analysing input time of these successful authentications,
a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction (due to violation of the sphericity as-
sumption) revealed a statistically significant main effect
0-switch
passwords
1-switch
passwords
2-switch
passwords
3-switch
passwords
Eye Gaze 2.39 2.85 3.58 4.92
Head Pose 2.35 2.93 3.72 4.68
Tapping 1.69 2.28 2.76 3.5
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Figure 4: Controller tapping results in significantly faster
authentications compared to gaze and head pose. Surface
switches increase authentication time significantly. Significance of
p < .001 is denoted by ***.
of pointing method (F1.619,35.617 = 38.894, p < .05) and
number of switches on authentication time (F2.477,54.497 =
309.887, p < .05). It also showed a significant two-way in-
teraction between pointing method and number of switches
on authentication time (F3.619,79.621 = 5.096, p < .05).
Further analysis was conducted to distinguish the impact of
each independent variable. Individual ANOVAs for each
switches condition and post hoc t-tests with Bonferroni
correction showed that across all switches, authentica-
tion time using controller tapping (M=2.60 s,SD=0.90 s)
is significantly faster (p < .05) than when using eye gaze
(M=3.60 s,SD=1.35 s) or head pose (M=3.44 s,SD=1.07 s).
We found no significant differences between gaze and head
pose (p > .05). Results are summarised in Figure 4. We
also found that authentication time is significantly different
across switches (p < .05, Figure 4).
Entry Accuracy
Entry accuracy is the number of correct entries during au-
thentication. The average successful accuracy was 90.80%
across all conditions with 88.2% (SD=32.2%) for eye gaze,
92.3% (SD=26.8%) for head pose, and 91.9% (SD=27.3%)
for controller tapping. This is inline with prior work on au-
thentication in VR with 82% [21] and 93% [11].
Figure 5: The mean Euclidean
distances between attackers’
guesses and actual PINs show
that a) increasing switches
improves security, and b) eye
gaze is more secure compared
to head pose and controller
tapping, even in advanced
threat models. Significance of p
< .05 is denoted by *.
Study 2: Security Evaluation
We invited 15 participants (5 females, 10 males) aged be-
tween 17 and 44 years (M = 26.6, SD = 6.79) with the ob-
jective of role play bystanding attackers and observe the ex-
perimenter during authentications. To motivate participants
to perform well, they took part in a lottery for an additional
£8 voucher where the chance of winning increases as they
correctly guess more PINs.
Design and Procedure
We added IV3) Threat Model with three conditions: Pen
and Paper, 3D Replica, and Video Recordings as additional
independent variable. We trained the participants by: a) in-
troducing them to the arrangement of the digits and surface
colours of RubikAuth, b) allowing them to enter multiple
PINs using all pointing methods, and c) running training at-
tacks on all pointing methods. PINs were entered by the
experimenter, while we simulated the three threat models
with the participant as the attacker. Each participant per-
formed 36 attacks against: 1 PIN×4 switches×3 pointing
methods×3 threat models. This results in overall 540 ob-
servation attacks. Attacks were performed on 36 predefined
unique PINs to ensure fairness of comparisons. Partici-
pants were told which pointing method will be used and the
beginning and end of the authentication process.
Successful Attack Rate
We measured the successful attack rate, i.e., the percent-
age of times the correct PIN was guessed. Attacks were
successful 8 out of 540 times (1.48%): 0 against eye gaze
(0%), 4 against head pose (2.22%), and 4 against controller
tapping (2.22%). 7 out of 8 (87.5%) successful attacks were
on 0-switch PINs. Results are summarised in Table 2.
Attack Accuracy
To gain better insights on how close the guesses are to the
entered PINs, we calculated the Euclidean distance be-
tween the centre of the entered PIN symbol (users’ inputs)
and the centre of each guessed PIN symbol (attackers’
guesses). While previous work used Levenshtein distance
to measure similarity of guesses [5, 11, 22], we opted for
Euclidean distance (ED) because it better reflects spatial
distances between targets on different surfaces. An attack
is considered more successful if the resulting ED between
the guess and the actual PIN is shorter.
To study the effect of the independent variables on similar-
ity of their guesses to the correct PINs, we ran a three-way
repeated measures ANOVA. No significant three-way inter-
action was found (p > .05). We ran subsequent two-way
ANOVA tests where two-way interaction effects were found,
and followed those by pair-wise comparisons using t-tests.
We used Bonferroni for controlling familywise errors.
In case of threat model 1, where attackers used pen and
paper to note their observations, attacks against controller
tapping are significantly (p < .05) more successful when
PINs contain 0-switches (M=0.147,SD=0.102), com-
pared to 2-switches (M=0.248,SD=0.070) and 3-switches
(M=0.259,SD=0.056), where 0 is a perfect match to the
correct PIN and 0.37 is an unsuccessful attack. We also
found that RubikAuth PINs that contain 0-switches are
significantly more secure when entered using eye gaze
(M=0.261,SD=0.075) compared to controller tapping
(M=0.147,SD=0.102) (Fig. 5). When attackers use a
smart phone to record and play back the authentications
(threat model 3), entering PINs using gaze (M=0.251,
SD=0.057) is significantly more secure (p < .05) than
head pose (M=0.218,SD=0.079) and tapping (M=0.204,
SD=0.046) (Fig. 5).
Figure 6: More advanced threat
models resulted in significant more
accurate successful attacks when
input provided with head pose and
controller tapping. Significance of p
< .05 is denoted by *.
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To understand if the advanced threat models resulted in
more successful attacks, we compared the accuracy of
guesses by running multiple ANOVAs. We found a signif-
icant main effect of threat model on ED when using head
pose (F2,28 = 4.317, p < .05) and tapping (F2,28 = 5.576,
p < .05). Post hoc analysis using t-tests with Bonferroni
correction confirmed the significant differences between
threat model 3 (M=0.218,SD=0.079) and threat model
1 (M=0.257,SD=0.044) when using head pose, and be-
tween threat model 3 (M=0.204,SD=0.045) and threat
model 2 (M=0.239,SD=0.059) when using tapping (Fig. 6).
Discussion and Future Work
Using Manipulable 3D Objects for Authentication
Our two user studies highlight the benefits of leveraging
natural two-handed interaction for authentication in VR. Au-
thentications with RubikAuth are fast and highly resilient to
observation attacks, even in advanced threat models (100%
for gaze-based interaction). This is also attributed to the
high cognitive effort required to observe the manipulations
and multiple visual channels, such as hand movements, at
the same time [4, 19, 22, 29]. In a future work, we plan to
conduct an in-depth analysis of users’ and attackers’ cogni-
tive effort and plan to incorporate additional aspects of the
human body such as foot-tapping for selection in RubikAuth
as this could overwhelm attackers even more [25].
For high observation resistance when using controller tap-
ping, we recommend to include at least one switch in Ru-
bikAuth PINs. Gaze performs well against all studied threat
models even without switches but at the expense of longer
authentication time. Qualitative feedback from the security
study revealed that some poses allow selection from mul-
tiple surfaces without explicitly rotating the cube. This can
be particularly effective against observations when com-
bined with gaze pointing, and could potentially counteract
the increased authentication time caused by rotating the
cube. We recommend to leverage manipulable 3D objects
for frequent authentications in VR as authentications are
fast (1.69 s to 4.92 s) and highly secure (97.78% - 100%).
Employing Suitable Threat Models
Existing work focused mostly on one-time shoulder surf-
ing attacks, and video attacks recorded using a stationary
camera [8, 10, 11]. We employed three threat models that
simulate a best case scenario for attackers. While success-
ful attack rates did not differ significantly across the threat
models, the accuracy of guesses increased significantly.
This allowed us to gain a better understanding of the impact
of switches and pointing methods on observation attacks.
We argue that future evaluations of authentication schemes
should employ advanced threat models like the ones con-
sidered in this paper to ensure realistic results.
Conclusion
We investigated authentication in VR using a manipula-
ble 3D cube. We compared pointing using eye gaze, head
pose, and controller tapping. We conducted two within-
subjects experiments, a usability study (N=23) and a se-
curity study (N=15). We found that entering a four-symbol
PIN using controller tapping is significantly faster (2.60 s)
than head pose (3.44 s) and eye gaze (3.60 s). In terms
of observation resistance, eye gaze outperformed head
pose and controller tapping with a observation resistance
of 100%, 97.78%, and 97.78% respectively. Our results
suggest that providing attackers with support material con-
tributes to more critical security evaluations.
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